When "genre" is applied as an adjective, not a noun, what does it mean? Genre movie, genre television, genre genres...
Speaking as someone who isn't in any way part of the entertainment industry, my impression is that it's a code word for "nerdy". The undertone is that labeling media as "nerdy" is too embarrassing. Much better to use the code word whenever possible. As a nerd, I can't help feeling a little offended by this.
Part of my issue is that this practice raises more questions than it answers. I've read that this usage of "genre" is taken directly from the book publishing terminology "genre fiction". According to the Wikipedia entry for genre fiction, crime, mystery, and romance are all identifiable media genres that fiction creators intentionally target. Doesn't this indicate that Breaking Bad is "genre" (crime)? NCIS (mystery)? Rom-coms (romance)? These appear to be genre fiction according to the established definition. If someone objects to calling these genre fiction, then that objection is an indication that the genre adjective is really a code word now, and not short for "genre fiction".
I suppose that there are alternatives to both "genre" and "nerdy". These alternatives emphasize the divergence of these genre genres from prosaic contemporary life: speculative, imaginative, alternate-reality. I'm generally unimpressed by the blatant substitution of code words, but at least these alternatives positively emphasize common characteristics of the works rather than negatively emphasize what the works are not (i.e., Not Literary).
Showing posts with label Words and Grammar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Words and Grammar. Show all posts
Friday, October 12, 2012
Thursday, March 08, 2012
trigger words
Sometimes I like to select words that I know to be "triggers" for particular thoughts and emotions. My purpose isn't to follow the basic communications proverb "consider your audience" 1 but to provoke internal contradiction and confusion. It's fun to watch the reaction. I'll concede that it isn't constructive or respectful.
For instance, imagine a hypothetical conversation with someone who's angered by Wall Street yet who also has a fanatic attachment to free markets2.
"We need to do something about those thieves and gamblers on Wall Street."
"Who is we? Are you suggesting 'government intervention'?"
"No! Government intervention is always bad. I just mean that Wall Street should play fair."
"Are you proposing better 'regulation' to define and enforce fair play?"
"No! Regulations are always bad. But what if all the money that's currently sunk into finance was in manufacturing instead?"
"You mean a 'redistribution' of that money? Or 'public investment'?"
"No! Redistribution is always bad, and so is when the government tries to pick winners by investing. Forget that. What the individual worker needs is more power and a greater share of the overall pie. Despite their hard work they earn so little compared to company executives."
"As individuals, workers don't exert much power. As a group, they could. They could 'bargain collectively' to argue their case for a greater share."
"No! Collective bargaining is always bad. Really, the cause of the crisis was too much debt. I wish Wall Street hadn't swindled people by providing them with mortgages."
"Those mortgages were voluntary. So the underlying problem was the 'free exchange' of credit?"
"No! Free exchange is always good. The problem was that the people who took out those mortgages weren't knowledgeable about adjustable rates, so they were at an information disadvantage compared to the lenders."
"A market in which any participants have incomplete information isn't an ideal well-functioning market. Are you asserting that the market therefore failed to 'self-regulate' or act 'rationally' or 'efficiently'?"
"No! Markets always adjust rapidly to compensate for every weakness or eventuality. Therefore the problem must have been the government. The government has a monopoly on the money supply, hence its mismanagement of the money supply must be the culprit."
"That makes sense if excessive money forced people to take stupid actions. Would that the opposite is true: that it's better to cut off the majority of credit and speculative loans altogether? That would certainly restrict the generation of 'start-ups' and 'small business' to the 'independently wealthy', who can finance their own risks."
"No! I greatly like start-ups, small business, and self-made men who started out, um, independently poor. Talking to you is so frustrating. You keep stating things the wrong way."
1By quoting the proverb, I'm not implying that I'm effective at observing it. For instance, I'm spectacularly uncertain who the audience of this blog is. (According to the redone Blogger interface for posts, "nobody" isn't too far off!)
2The key word is "fanatic". In my opinion, that's distinct from believing in the macroeconomic truism that, in practice, decentralized experimenting actors in a well-functioning market are better at adapting to information and change than a centralized stagnant authority. Someone can have principles without being blind to the complexity and limitations inherent to applying those principles.
For instance, imagine a hypothetical conversation with someone who's angered by Wall Street yet who also has a fanatic attachment to free markets2.
"We need to do something about those thieves and gamblers on Wall Street."
"Who is we? Are you suggesting 'government intervention'?"
"No! Government intervention is always bad. I just mean that Wall Street should play fair."
"Are you proposing better 'regulation' to define and enforce fair play?"
"No! Regulations are always bad. But what if all the money that's currently sunk into finance was in manufacturing instead?"
"You mean a 'redistribution' of that money? Or 'public investment'?"
"No! Redistribution is always bad, and so is when the government tries to pick winners by investing. Forget that. What the individual worker needs is more power and a greater share of the overall pie. Despite their hard work they earn so little compared to company executives."
"As individuals, workers don't exert much power. As a group, they could. They could 'bargain collectively' to argue their case for a greater share."
"No! Collective bargaining is always bad. Really, the cause of the crisis was too much debt. I wish Wall Street hadn't swindled people by providing them with mortgages."
"Those mortgages were voluntary. So the underlying problem was the 'free exchange' of credit?"
"No! Free exchange is always good. The problem was that the people who took out those mortgages weren't knowledgeable about adjustable rates, so they were at an information disadvantage compared to the lenders."
"A market in which any participants have incomplete information isn't an ideal well-functioning market. Are you asserting that the market therefore failed to 'self-regulate' or act 'rationally' or 'efficiently'?"
"No! Markets always adjust rapidly to compensate for every weakness or eventuality. Therefore the problem must have been the government. The government has a monopoly on the money supply, hence its mismanagement of the money supply must be the culprit."
"That makes sense if excessive money forced people to take stupid actions. Would that the opposite is true: that it's better to cut off the majority of credit and speculative loans altogether? That would certainly restrict the generation of 'start-ups' and 'small business' to the 'independently wealthy', who can finance their own risks."
"No! I greatly like start-ups, small business, and self-made men who started out, um, independently poor. Talking to you is so frustrating. You keep stating things the wrong way."
1By quoting the proverb, I'm not implying that I'm effective at observing it. For instance, I'm spectacularly uncertain who the audience of this blog is. (According to the redone Blogger interface for posts, "nobody" isn't too far off!)
2The key word is "fanatic". In my opinion, that's distinct from believing in the macroeconomic truism that, in practice, decentralized experimenting actors in a well-functioning market are better at adapting to information and change than a centralized stagnant authority. Someone can have principles without being blind to the complexity and limitations inherent to applying those principles.
Friday, January 13, 2012
words that authors set on Repeat
Full-length books are certain to contain repetitive words. Some of those repetitions are more noticeable than others.
- In The Beginning of Infinity by David Deutsch, one of those words is "parochial".
- In Darth Plagueis by James Luceno, one of those words is "rock" as a verb, which refers to a head motion, often from side to side. Are you ready to rock? Your head?
Friday, July 01, 2011
locating myself in the irreligious taxonomy
I chose to use "irreligiosity" as a broad category for four reasons. First, "areligious" is too easily confused with "religious" and it doesn't seem like a popular coinage. Second, I felt that the "non-" prefix on "nonreligious" sounds too, um, noncommittal. Third, on the other hand, "antireligious" insinuates excessive and active opposition. Fourth, "irreligious" shares the "ir-" prefix with "irreverent", which is appropriate. Irreverence merely indicates that, unlike others, someone doesn't revere something. As I understand it, irreverence of religion is an adequately-drawn yet far-flung border for irreligiosity. For irreverence could take many forms of thoughts or actions.
Nevertheless, after wading through Wikipedia, starting at the Irreligion page, I've learned of finer distinctions communicated by other terminology.
Nevertheless, after wading through Wikipedia, starting at the Irreligion page, I've learned of finer distinctions communicated by other terminology.
- I hadn't considered the possibility of honoring or obeying aspects of a religion, integrating it into personal identity, but not believing its ideas. Religion may be a cultural/ethnic institution as opposed to a belief system. Therefore someone who doesn't claim the existence of any gods could deny being "irreligious" because religion retains importance in their lives. In my opinion, "irreligiosity" applies to the status of held conclusions rather than circumstances of birth or upbringing. I would say that irreligious individuals sometimes perform religious acts. For example, I've ceased personal religious behavior, but that won't stop me from participation in societal holidays of religious origin. Meaningless customs can still be enjoyable. I don't feel a need to associate myself with specific religion, but I comprehend that my situation is not universal.
- I agree to the philosophical stance of naturalism or materialism. This is a stricter judgment than general irreligiosity. I'm dismissive of all supernatural speculation. But this need not be true of everyone who doesn't assent to religious notions. They might reject every religion they've ever heard and opine the positive existence of unknown or loosely-defined gods. Perhaps they're ambiguous on the "god question" and maintain that human spirits can exit bodily confines. Maybe they're fond of trusting that "someone" is always watching or they simply assume that there can't be a universe without a creative Force to jump-start it. Anyway, none of these beliefs in supernaturally-based things are sufficiently convincing to me.
- Along the same line, I'm not impressed by the idea that the supernatural is unprovable. I understand that the absence of proof isn't a proof of absence. However, in my interpretation of Pragmatic philosophy, absolute proof isn't a realistic or necessary standard. Coming to the point, the dubiousness of supernatural hypotheses doesn't justify a provisional judgment in favor and/or changes to future actions. I can invent a multitude of unverified explanations, but I'm not obligated to incorporate the fictions into the working assumptions that affect my actual existence. Believable theories display Pragmatic truth through implications that are susceptible to human actions like experimentation and calculation and observation. Under these guidelines, supernatural "stuff" that has no effect detectable by human means, not even in theory, is...not..."true" like everything else is "true". Anything supernatural that supposedly has such effects has the possibility of being true. In short, imagined supernatural objects that are completely ignorable could only be "true" in a pitifully weak sense. Since almost all proposed supernatural objects impinge on reality, almost all proposed supernatural objects can be judged as true or false via the usual methods and evaluations. I can't prove that irrelevant gods cannot exist, but I think it's reasonable to pragmatically determine, by induction, that theoretical gods whose alleged traces are missing or indefinite do not exist. By and large, "atheist" seems like a label that closely approximates my perspective.
- As I keep repeating, I don't wish to annihilate religion. I'm eager for breaking links between religion and political power. Religion shouldn't affect a citizen's status. Government shouldn't endorse or fund religions. Religious and irreligious can exercise their democratic freedoms. Furthermore, religion is beneficial insofar as it provides motivation for living with more considerateness and deliberation. I don't mind attempts at non-coercive conversion (I'll grant that all too many cases veer too close to emotional exploitation and manipulation). These opinions set me apart from "antitheism".
- At this time, I'm unsure whether "Humanist" is an accurate description of me. I support happiness and freedom and not being egocentric, but surely Humanistic ethics has more substance than what I'm seen so far?
Monday, May 30, 2011
"energy" misuse
The prevailing ideas of a culture change over time. Not terribly long ago, and less than an eye-blink in geological time, my ancestors would've observed reality through the eyes of spirits. Demons and angels hindering and assisting humans. God willing the sun to rise each day. And perhaps the most persistent idea of all: a soul operating the body like so many levers.
Around the time in history that I live, humans have moved on to naturalistic theories supported by reproducible experiments and communicated by mathematical relationships. Atoms aren't considered nearly as controversial. The inferred forces are impersonal; no empathy is necessary to calculate the operations. Public education has taught (hopefully...) the essentials of a scientific interpretation of the universe.
With these differences in belief, common vocabulary has shifted also. Presently it's much more expected for someone to use the word "energy" for mysterious substances to explain everything in moral and egocentric terms. "Bad energy" in place of "demon", "good energy" in place of "angel", "weak energy" in place of "phlegmatic humour". As we've all learned, energy is everywhere and in everything, so why couldn't there be energy of "spirit" in the same way? Energy is seen by its effects. Confounding effects could just be psi energy. Ghosts and souls are sentient clouds of energy.
My complaint is that the scientific definition of "energy" isn't applicable to those contexts. There's no compatible theory to back up the use of that highly technical word. Central to the notion of energy is that it's convertible and measurable. Energy does stuff. Mystical energy isn't "energy" as understood by scientists unless it's clear how to turn other forms of energy into it or turn it into other forms of energy. Even the most "intangible" of energy can be rated by what precisely happens when the energy is converted. How does it affect temperature and motion of matter? In the scientific understanding, one can't posit as many new types of energy as one wishes. There's a detectable balance of energetic quantities (subject to quantum indeterminacy at the truly tiny scales). If the entire energy equation has no missing "terms" within a reasonable bound of error, no mystery energy is there.
Therefore, to avoid giving the wrong impression, I propose that spiritual hypotheses change their terminology from "energy", which has firm physical definitions, to "mana". Speaking in good faith, "mana" is a more effective reflection of the level of discourse. Say "naughty mana" rather than "negative energy". "Think-y mana" rather than "mental energy". "Ghoulish mana" rather than "disembodied energy". "Clogged mana" rather than "blocked energy flow".
Simply by adjusting word usage to match the distinction, the mana experts can more effectively move on to research the open question of how mana relates to energy. For instance, how high in meters can the mana in the average human soul lift an object of mass 102 grams?
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Art's Razorette
Art's Razorette: When "Occam's razor" is mentioned by name in a casual conversation, the simplest explanation is that the speaker is trying far too hard to impress listeners with his or her purported intelligence and/or learning.
(Sometimes it is appropriate to name-drop the razor, particularly in the midst of formal or academic argumentation, but only with due discretion.)
(Sometimes it is appropriate to name-drop the razor, particularly in the midst of formal or academic argumentation, but only with due discretion.)
Sunday, May 23, 2010
meaning through isomorphism
Moreover, Gödel's construction revealed in a crystal-clear way that the line between "direct" and "indirect" self-reference (indeed, between direct and indirect reference, and that's even more important!) is completely blurry, because his construction pinpoints the essential role played by isomorphism (another name for coding) in the establishment of reference and meaning. Gödel's work is, to me, the most beautiful possible demonstration of how meaning emerges from and only from isomorphism, and of how any notion of "direct" meaning (i.e., codeless meaning) is incoherent. In brief, it shows that semantics is an emergent quality of complex syntax, which harks back to my earlier remark in the Post Scriptum to Chapter 1, namely: "Content is fancy form."prelude and the problem
Months ago I finally finished reading Douglas Hofstadter's Metamagical Themas. Since it's a collection of columns about varied topics, I don't plan to comment on it with the same level of enthusiasm that I applied to I am a Strange Loop (if I were, I would've gotten around to it much sooner!). But one of its recurring ideas, also raised in Hofstadter's other books, is so fruitful that I can't resist rambling about it at excessive length: meaning through isomorphism. I'd further claim that its importance rivals and complements that of self-reference, which usually has the spotlight in commentary about Hofstadter's ideas.
The universal philosophical issue or "problem" of meaning is easily explained. It's undeniable that people experience meanings and that a meaning is a relation. One chunk of stuff "means" another chunk of stuff; noun _____ represents, defines, symbolizes, or analogizes noun _______. But how can people reconcile or harmonize this experience of meaning with a universe that, according to the best means of detection and reason, consists of pieces of matter whose interactions are consistently indifferent to relations of meaning? Does/Can meaning really exist? Assuming it does, then what is meaning, where is meaning, and how does meaning originate? I'll work my way back to this later.
isomorphisms
The preceding questions have many proposed answers. I'm convinced that Hofstadter's description of meaning through isomorphism is a pretty good one. A mathematical isomorphism has a rigorous logical definition, but in the looser sense intended here, an isomorphism is simply matching one or more parts of one aggregate with parts of another aggregate such that one or more relations between the parts of one aggregate remain valid between the matched parts in the other aggregate. In a word, relations in an isomorphism are "preserved". (In passing, note the circular definitions that an "aggregate" is a collection of "parts" and "parts" are anything in an "aggregate" collection.)
To take an elementary example, if one aggregate is the set of numbers (4, 8, 15) and the other aggregate is the set of numbers (16, 23, 42), then an isomorphism that preserves the relation "greater-than" could match 4 to 16 and 8 to 23 and 15 to 42 because 8 is greater than 4 and 23 is greater than 16, 15 is greater than 8 and 42 is greater than 23, etc. (Naturally, the relation of "subtraction" is NOT preserved since 8 - 4 = 4 and 23 - 16 = 7.)
At first glance, this may seem like dodging the question of meaning. Why should anyone care that, through a greater-than isomorphism, (4,8,15) "means" (16,23,42)? Well, that depends on the situation. Hypothetically, if someone's purpose involved the greater-than relation and he or she could more easily manipulate numbers less than 16, then that person could work on (4,8,15) and use the isomorphism to apply the results to (16,23,42). Imagine the depressing story of a pitiful calculating device that can only store its numbers with 4 bits each but its task is to find the maximum of 16, 23, 42. Still too trivial? Then ponder a comparable isomorphism between number sequences: taking the sequence 0..255, matching 0..127 to itself, and matching 128..255 to the sequence of -128..-1 . Now go read about the computer storage of signed integers to find out why this comparable isomorphism isn't a toy example at all.
Thus the basic idea is straightforward but its implications are surprisingly wide-ranging as shown by Hofstadter in his more mind-bending sections. His exemplar is the isomorphism in the incompleteness theorems between numbers and the symbols of a formal logic system, although he returns time and again to descriptions of the human capability for analogy, whether in the contexts of translation or recognition or self-image or creativity. A common thread is the logically-strange tendency to transcend by self-reference, which goes by labels like "quote", "break out", "go meta", "use-mention distinction".
applied to computers
However, apart from complicated self-reference, Hofstadter admits in his serious AI speculations that mere meaning through isomorphism remains simultaneously effortless for people yet bewildering to computer science. People can figure out an original isomorphism that works and then not rely on it beyond suitable limits, but a program can't. Whatever are the underlying mechanisms that originally evolved in the human brain for reaching the "correct" answer in a complex environment, no artificial program has quite the same ultra-flexible Frankenstein mix of (what appear from the outside to be) random walks, data mining, feedback, decentralization, simulation, and judgment. Given its mental acts, we shouldn't be shocked by the sheer quantity of lobes and connections and structure in the brain, and maybe its operation is less a monolithic program than an entire computer packed with programs interrupting one another to get a chance at directing the body's motor functions.
On the other hand, this conspicuous lack of an AI for pragmatic isomorphisms is all too familiar to application programmers like myself. Our job is to fill the gap by the routine imposition of meaning through isomorphism. That is, we try to create a combination of algorithms and data that's an isomorphism for a specific human problem, like running payroll for a company. In a similar fashion, the total computing system is a stack of increasingly-complicated isomorphisms of the application programmer's work. As Hofstadter writes in his columns on Lisp (and properly-educated programmers know), the top-level program is compiled into an isomorphic representation, then the next level down does its own compilation, and so forth, until the original program is in the executable form appropriate for the relevant non-virtual hardware. The towering edifice is an impressive illustration of the exponential power of isomorphisms to capture and translate meaning into, ultimately, an electrical flow.
(Some technically-minded readers may be questioning which "relations" are preserved by these isomorphisms. After all, one or more parts of the "pipeline" could possibly optimize the original code in any number of ways like function in-lining, variable removal, tail calls... In this case, the relations are abstract but are in the category "the effect of the original": order of statements that are dependent, values of constants including user-visible strings, access details of I/O performed. When relations like these in the original code aren't preserved, the pieces lower in the stack thereby fail to carry out actual isomorphisms that would express the meaning.)
applied to information theory, communications, art
Of course, meaning through isomorphism isn't the only theoretical framework around for understanding computer processing as a whole. The same claim could be made for information theory, which is throughly successful and in use every day. Fortunately, the two are compatible. Say that the communication channel's sender and receiver each have aggregates, and the message symbolically encoded and sent over the channel is an isomorphism between their aggregates. So then the symbols of the channel's message indicate each match from one aggregate's part to the other aggregate's part. Before the first symbol, the receiver is at maximum uncertainty or entropy about the isomorphism. After the first symbol and each symbol thereafter, the receiver can use knowledge of 1) the matches communicated previously, 2) its own aggregate, and 3) its own aggregate's relations between parts to make increasingly likely guesses about the remaining matches (or correct randomly sent errors on a noisy channel). In accordance with information theory, good "entropy coding" for this message would send no more bits to the receiver than are required in order for the receiver's knowledge of aggregates and relations to infer the rest of the isomorphism. The isomorphisms processed in a computer system allow for lower information entropy and therefore greater compression. The most interesting portions of a codec have the responsibility of using relations among parts of the media stream to trash or reconstruct some parts of the aggregate stream.
Given the compatibility between meaning through isomorphism and information theory, it's unsurprising that communication in general is perhaps its most natural manifestation. A language is an aggregate of spoken or written words. The universe is an aggregate of pure experience (I dare you to be more vague!). Hence a worded message is an isomorphism between language and the universe. Rather, the message is an aggregate of words that were purposefully selected in order to communicate, via the language-universe isomorphism, an aggregate of thoughts about pure experience. The relations preserved by this isomorphism are countless and endlessly varied. In the message "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog", "brown" is an adjective to "fox" so the indicated fox must have the color brown in depictions, "jumps" is a verb to the subject "fox" so the indicated fox must be in the midst of a jumping action, "over" is a preposition connecting the phrase "The quick brown fox jumps" to the phrase "the lazy dog" so the indicated fox must be of higher elevation than the indicated dog. Part of the reason why computer parsing of raw human language is stymied is due to a computer's lack of a human's uncannily deep well of experiences to fuel a feedback loop between the comprehension of syntax and semantics. In practice, the nuanced syntax of sentence structure, word forms, and connectives nevertheless results in highly ambiguous statements that require worldly knowledge and/or context to disentangle.
How exactly people can decode their own words is a fiendish and glorious enigma that's convinced many speculators to tie language to the essence of humanity. Those who presume a soul frequently equate it to the explicitly verbal segments of intelligence (e.g. "confess with your lips"). It's definitely a truism that, of all earthly creatures, people have the most developed and subtle languages. They can organize their mental and social lives to levels of complexity that contrast with the simplicity of their materials. All their creations in language, art, and other domains can have symbolic depth.
applied to the distinction between form and content
These feats of abstractive composition and interpretation lead to a commonsense division between a work's "surface form" and its "meaningful content". For instance, a surface form of red is said to represent the inner content of the artist's aggression, and a milestone of any artistic genre is the point at which critics begin to tirelessly accuse its artists of betraying the genre's pioneers by producing "mindless copies" that mimic style (form) but without substance (content).
Finally I return to one of the points in the opening quote. The practical classification of an expression's qualities into form and content just described is contradicted by Hofstadter's pithy motto "content is fancy form". In his words, "[...]'content' is just a shorthand way of saying 'form as perceived by a very fancy apparatus capable of making complex and subtle distinctions and abstractions and connections to prior concepts' ". Elsewhere he writes that form and content are on a "continuum", and the gap between is "muddy". Form and content are simply the same expression evaluated on different strata or in different domains. Syntax and semantics are different in degree, not in kind. If someone isn't taken aback by this proposition then he or she might not grasp its import.
I've found it instructive to employ this perspective on John Searle's thought-provoking Chinese room argument. There's a person, completely ignorant of written Chinese, in a closed room armed with only the materials necessary to 1) receive a message in Chinese, 2) manually execute the algorithm of a program that can pass a Turing Test in Chinese, 3) send the reply generated back out of the room. Assume, as in any Turing Test, that the judge outside the room who sends the original message and receives the reply can only rely on the messages to determine whether the unknown correspondent knows Chinese. Since the algorithm in the Chinese room can pass the Turing Test by producing highly-convincing replies, isn't it true that 1) based on the replies the judge will conclude that the person in the Chinese room understands the messages and 2) the judge's conclusion is in direct contradiction to the person's actual level of knowledge of Chinese? If you grant these two points, then the Turing Test criterion for "understanding" fails to find the right answer for the person in the Chinese room. Now change the role of the Chinese room inhabitant from a person+algorithm into a computer program executing the same algorithm. Remember that the person in the Chinese room passed the Turing Test by "shuffling symbols" that had no meaning to him or her. Is it any more reasonable to think that a program that passes a Turing Test is doing anything more than "shuffling Chinese symbols" like the person in the Chinese room? The upshot of the argument is that no matter how well a message's form of linguistic symbols is processed, its content or meaning could still be unknown to the processor; understanding of form does not imply understanding of content so content cannot be form.
As I see it, the meaning-through-isomorphism interpretation leads to a disturbing viewpoint on the Chinese room argument (reminiscent of how the EPR "paradox" led to disturbing but theoretically-consistent results for quantum mechanics). I'm restricted to a single clue to deduce who in the Chinese room argument really knows the meaning/content/semantics of the message: the location of the aggregates to which the message's symbols are isomorphic. The argument postulates upfront that the person doesn't know the Chinese language. In other words, he or she doesn't have any information about the aggregate or relations of the Chinese language, but the message's symbols are parts of that unknown aggregate. Clearly no isomorphism happens in the person and so none of the intended meaning is there. I can agree that the person's lack of the necessary aggregate makes him or her clueless about the messages. But that leaves one possibility: the algorithm is the thing that understands the meaning. In the Chinese room, or indeed in any scenario alike to a Turing Test, in order for the algorithm to form convincing replies at all it must be able to decode the meaning, and to decode the meaning it must have the necessary aggregates to complete the isomorphism. Based on the usual opinion that understanding demonstrates intelligence, for the purposes of the Chinese room, the algorithm is more intelligent than the person. From the standpoint of the message's meaning, the person's participation in the communication is akin to functioning as the algorithm's tool, channel, or messenger (according the customary literary allusion, the algorithm is the person's "Cyrano de Bergerac"). When meaning occurs through isomorphism, there's no logical contradiction. The judge's guess that the person within knows Chinese is nothing more than an honest mistake. Don't blame the messenger for a passing Turing Test.
applied to philosophy and the brain
I called the idea of an intelligent algorithm "disturbing", but the delegation of various "intelligent" tasks isn't novel. Mathematical calculations were one of the first to be handed over to algorithms and devices. Then there's the long list of recommendations for sundry occurrences (do this when there's a fire, do that when someone needs resuscitation). And how much of the typical job is reducible to either rote actions or following new orders whose rationale is unknown?
The disquieting aspect of the imaginary Turing Test algorithm is the unprecedented usurping of the noblest of intellectual pursuits, understanding meaning. A traditional philosopher might declare that to be human is to understand and, furthermore, understanding is an accomplishment that can't be performed by anything else. Rocks don't understand. Plants don't understand. Animals don't understand but many are trainable. In contrast, humans experience a detailed "meaning mirror" of the universe that's symbolized in their languages. The "meaning mirror" has the name "mind" or "soul". Humans can understand the meaning of an expression by its effect on the "mind". In summary, meanings are ethereal inhabitants of minds, and only humans have minds.
Such a traditional explanation is appealing (to some people especially so) but it's complicated because it grants "first-class co-existence" to a purely mental/non-physical world. By making access to the cognitive world a special privilege of humans, it's dispiriting to the prospect of AI ever arising. It's also messy because people tend to embellish the details of the non-physical world in a multitude of opposing directions. It conflicts with the normal and productive method of the sciences, which is to find physical causes for phenomena. It outlines the existence of meanings but at numerous costs.
Dropping the traditional philosopher's explanation leaves the philosophical question of meaning unanswered...unless isomorphism is introduced in its place. Isomorphism furnishes a plausible intellectual underpinning for meaning in a solely materialistic universe. An isomorphism requires only materialistic ingredients for its elements: parts, aggregates, relations, matches.
What materials? The choices are everywhere, as boundless as creativity. Earlier, one set of materials was the software and hardware components of a computer system. In his writings Hofstadter has used DNA as a sterling example whose meaning is the proteins transcribed from it. And in keeping with the section on communication, any usable information channel is a candidate for meaning through isomorphism.
For philosophical concerns, the more relevant set of materials for isomorphism is the human brain. If we're to give up believing in our non-physical realities, we should reasonably expect a competitive brain-based theory of our mental capacities and qualia. I expect the brain's networks to be effective materials for isomorphisms. The combined excitatory and inhibitory network connections seem like prime building blocks for exquisite parts, aggregates, relations, and matches. Connections in general are implicitly essential to the definition of an isomorphism. An aggregate is parts that are connected, a relation is a connection between parts, a match is a connection between parts in separate aggregates.
One can then concede the, for lack of a better name, mind/matter isomorphism: the physical layout of the brain's network is directly responsible for all "non-physical" thoughts we feel. I don't suggest that there's a "grandmother neuron" but that the numerous neurons and even more numerous neuronal junctions, in response to the onset of the relevant stimuli, effect a mental experience of grandmother, whatever that may be. I neither suggest that one brain's network layout of isomorphisms resembles a second brain's except on a gross regional level; the variance among individuals in immediate word-association responses certainly makes a closer resemblance doubtful. I do suggest that, with sufficient prior knowledge about the isomorphism between the specific brain's network and its environment, a "scan" of the merely anatomical changes associated with the formation of a new long-term memory would enable the scanner to know with some certainty what the memory was "about". (I'm skeptical that anyone could figure out a workable procedure for it. Brain interfaces are getting better all the time, but the goal is to clumsily train the brain and the interface to work together, not to accurately read the brain's ephemeral signals.)
applied to objectivity
The proposed isomorphism between a person's brain and his or her encounters with reality puts not only the philosophical categories of "mind" and "matter" in a new light but also the categories of "objective" and "subjective" meaning. Objectively, whenever a scientist examines eroded canyons with sedimentary rock walls, maybe unearthing fossilized water-dwellers, he or she can assert the ancient history of the river that flowed there long ago. The river left traces so the river can be factually inferred. Also objectively, given the full network of a brain (and many secondary clues?), the brain's memories could be deduced in theory. The thoughts of the brain left traces so the thoughts can be factually inferred. At the time people would've called the brain's thoughts subjective, but with enough work the thoughts might as well be called objective.
Obviously the isomorphism in a human brain is incredibly dense and interwoven, which causes the complexity of the undertaking to have the magnitude of a perfectly accurate measurement and forecast of all the weather in North America. It's too hasty to proclaim it impossible, though. People have managed to translate hieroglyphics and break the Enigma code. The elusiveness of the "right" isomorphism doesn't disqualify it from discovery (well, not counting some exceptions like 1) the perfect elusiveness of "isomorphisms", like one-time pads, that by design have "matches" but preserve precisely zero relations, and 2) degradation/corruption of the aggregate's material medium).
Having seemingly decided that the derivation of meaning through isomorphism places it into the "objective" category, one could be forgiven for attempting to additionally place it into the "unambiguous and undebatable" category. In people's regular conversations, the two often go hand-in-hand; objective facts are brought in to silence the clamor of unfounded opinions. Not so for isomorphisms. In fact, an isomorphism's objective existence is why it can't have any inherent authority or precedence over other isomorphisms. Surely people can agree on any number and flavor of criteria for the selection of an isomorphism, but there's no physical coercion. (I could elaborate on how the personal selection of isomorphisms is supportive of pragmatic philosophy but I won't...)
x + y = 815. I'm writing a message to send in a bottle, but in what language? I see a person holding two fingers against his forehead and I take for granted that he has a headache. You mention a common acquaintance by the name "Alex" and I conclude you're speaking of "Alexander" not "Alexandra". "Ambiguity" is more or less shorthand for too many isomorphism candidates to pick.
In a much more formal context, computer scientists have established ever-growing sets of problems that are proven to be solvable by the same kind of algorithm. When a fast algorithm solves any problem in the set, it could attack the rest, too. On an algorithmic basis, the problems are isomorphic. A computer scientist searching for a generalized solution to the set of problems doesn't need to "prefer" one to the rest. (He or she need not be too depressed. In most applications a "good enough" or "partial" solution is adequate.)
The "relativity" (non-preference) of objective isomorphisms is mind-blowing to me. It turns the world "inside-out". The Earth is not the center of the physical universe. Neither am I the center of the universe of meaning. After a thunderclap, the impact sets air in motion. The sound wave is one set of molecules jiggling, then the next, then the next. By moving similarly, i.e. isomorphically, aren't the air molecules transmitting the "meaning" of the thunderclap? Eventually, the air in my ear canals moves after being pushed in turn. The movement of the drum corresponds to an isomorphic shift in electrical impulses (yeah, I know I'm simplifying it). The nerve cells isomorphically react and in so doing continue to pass along the "meaning" of the thunderclap into the brain that I like to refer to as "mine". The connections in that brain isomorphically mirror my stored memories, spilling over into my language centers. "I hear thunder." In the relative terms of all these isomorphisms, who's to argue that I'm the origin of my spoken thunder message? But I may not be the terminus, either. What if my statement motivates the people around me to leap into action? Aren't their actions isomorphic to my statement? My message has made their actions meaningful. It started with a thunderclap.
Saturday, August 08, 2009
please state the nature of the medical emergency
The words of the title echo through my mind every time I read some blog or other about the efficient market hypothesis. And if the blog analyzes the Reconstruction Finance Corporation then I start thinking about Internet protocol definitions. Even if its topic is just purchasing power parity, I hear a faint sequence of whirs, clicks, drones, and static.
Monday, June 22, 2009
my favorite word for today is complexify
It ends in "-fy", it's a neat opposite to "simplify", and it's satisfying to have the word itself be a bit cumbersome to say and understand. Call a consultant today to help you complexify your infrastructure!
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
resist the temptation
Memo to the universe at large: resist the temptation to mention one or more of the words ["id","ego", "superego"] in discussions of the relationship among ["McCoy","Kirk","Spock"].
It's been done. To Death. Repeatedly.
It's been done. To Death. Repeatedly.
Friday, August 15, 2008
something worse than missing sarcasm online...
...is assuming the online statement is sarcastic when it's actually sincere.
"My mistake. I figured that he or she couldn't possibly be so ignorant|silly|dumb|unoriginal|hateful|presumptuous|arrogant."
It also has happened when I try to adjust to common interpersonal communication after passing time reading forums. People think I'm acting arch just because I look at them quizzically after they say something that's flatly ridiculous and I'm genuinely unsure whether to take them seriously.
"My mistake. I figured that he or she couldn't possibly be so ignorant|silly|dumb|unoriginal|hateful|presumptuous|arrogant."
It also has happened when I try to adjust to common interpersonal communication after passing time reading forums. People think I'm acting arch just because I look at them quizzically after they say something that's flatly ridiculous and I'm genuinely unsure whether to take them seriously.
Thursday, July 17, 2008
hey genious, you misspelled something there
I know it's just mean to laugh at spelling mistakes. The point of writing is to successfully communicate, and most of the time minor errors don't hamper that. (On the other hand, if it's a setting in which correctness matters--e.g., formal messages or applications for jobs that involve writing them--little oversights might rightly or wrongly communicate subtle secondary information about the incompetence or apathy of the author!) Also, each time I jibe I'm inviting fate to trip me next so as to restore the Universal Balance. Yes, I know there's no such thing, but in case humanity does someday discover it I figure I should be prepared.
However, I draw the line at "genious", because that's just too hilarious and self-referential to pass up. Ha ha ha! I can think of some related quotes: "Judge a pig contest? I don't know, I'm no super-genius... or are I?" by a Mr. Homer Simpson. "Me fail English? That's unpossible." by Ralph Wiggum.
However, I draw the line at "genious", because that's just too hilarious and self-referential to pass up. Ha ha ha! I can think of some related quotes: "Judge a pig contest? I don't know, I'm no super-genius... or are I?" by a Mr. Homer Simpson. "Me fail English? That's unpossible." by Ralph Wiggum.
Tuesday, April 08, 2008
my rhetorical compulsion
- rhetorical - of or relating to rhetoric
- rhetoric - the study of the effective use of language
- compulsion - an irresistible impulse to act, regardless of the rationality of the motivation
All the tenses of words like "I", "it", "be", "do", "have" are basic. Not reusing those words would be certifiably insane. My compulsion pertains solely to non-basic words. The previous paragraph's non-basic words include but are not limited to: "rhetorical", "compulsion", "suspect", "popular", "aversion", "general", "pervasive", "simple"... "Compulsion" is an exception since it's the subject in this case. As I compose a blog entry in Firefox I frequently activate the convenient "Find in this page" function to perform a redundance check with my hands staying on the keyboard. It's the next best thing to paying attention to the communication of my point.
I blame the growth of my rhetorical compulsion to several influences. The most reasonable of the bunch is that a moderate version of it is widespread advice: strive for precise, varied, colorful word choices. I'd add a close corollary: if every other sentence contains "very" then you should try harder, mmm'kay?
Another component is my awareness of stylometry. I'm perturbed by the thought that my mind can be correlated however imperfectly to analyses of my prose. What makes that annoyance still more illogical is that at the same time I know I have a particular style and I'm in fact unapologetic about it. Yet I avoid repetition in the hopeless effort to render myself more incalculable.
To flourish, especially in the beginning, a compulsion must have a driver that regularly presents the stimulus. Mine is when I read now and can't help noticing the author's favorite terms, descriptions, and expressions. "Huh. These characters' lips twitch a lot, and they often speak 'dryly'." I concede that it's unfair to compare the level of monotony in a novel to that of a blog (or an amateurish short story), but if I was applying a sense of proportion I wouldn't be compulsive about it, would I?
A vital ingredient of a habit is that it meets a real or imagined need of the actor. It somehow satisfies. In this instance, one of the favorable outcomes is remembering and using marginally obscure words. I'm not so far gone that I skim the thesaurus or dictionary for amusement (not enough plot). Nevertheless, I enjoy a little variety and novelty in my vocabulary, somewhat like listening to randomized playback or purposely not eating the same entrée at the same restaurant. And let's not bother to pretend that all words have equal zest.
Perhaps the ideal way to end this therapy session is a quote that exemplifies the disdain-provoking opposite extreme of my rhetorical compulsion:
You're asking me to be rational. That is something I know I cannot do. Believe me, I wish I could just wish away my feelings, but I can't.UPDATE (04/22/08): Handy word frequency counter here: http://www.writewords.org.uk/word_count.asp . Test my posts. G'head. Dare ya.
Thursday, February 07, 2008
peeve no. 256 is overuse of the word 'powerful'
Like the other word overuse peeves ("random" and "satire"), I have no issue with the word "powerful" when it's used as I think it should. For instance, when something is full of power, "powerful" is a fine description. In other cases, when the definition and/or quantification of the relevant "power" is debatable, a better word choice would be more interesting and more accurate.
- An experience provoked strong emotions, so therefore it was powerful, Mr. Critic? Fascinating. How many watts was it?...Oh, the experience had emotional or "psychic" power. How much emotional work did this power achieve? Enough to form one semi-vivid, long-term memory?...Would it do the same to any person? If not, does that imply each person has a different degree of emotional inertia? Hmm? Stop walking away from me...
- This software is powerful, Mr. Marketer? Fascinating. Where is the power lever? If I turn up the juice, will it use up more electricity? Does it have a "turbo boost" button I can press to make it run faster?...Yes, I know about nice and renice, but wouldn't those affect powerless software the same?...Oh, I see, the number of features is what makes it powerful. If I don't plan to ever use those features, will the software still be powerful for me? Eh?...Of course, how silly of me, what makes the software powerful is its set of sophisticated commands. When those coarse-grained commands make too many assumptions about what I expect, are those commands still powerful? Don't get angry, I just want to know what you mean...
- This programming language is powerful, Mr. Advocate? Fascinating. Does that mean it can do more than existing general-purpose languages?...No? Does that mean it has all the same features as language X, and more?...What? Cramming every feature and possibility into a language would be awful? Well then, does the powerfulness of the programming language mean that it runs fast?...I suppose you're right to say that's an implementation detail, and in any case the algorithm design can be far more important than the language for execution performance. What about the design?...You're saying succinctness is power. I recall reading about that once...
- Politician X is powerful, Mr. Pundit? Fascinating. He must be a fairly good athlete, then?... Ah, I see, you mean he's well-connected. So it isn't him that's powerful, but a network of people doing favors for each other?...Right, in a democracy his power would have come from the citizens who elected him. He's powerful because at election time he was popular enough?...Huh, he's powerful now, because he's good at persuasion. His powerfulness is really power redirected from everyone around him?...Naturally, he would also have official government powers according to his post. His powers allow him to command government employees. But if they consent because of his position in government, isn't the position the part that is powerful? Stop interrupting my questions...
Monday, January 07, 2008
nobrainers and non-brainers
I'm a pedantic and small-minded jerk for pointing and haw-hawing at spelling mistakes on the Web, but I enjoy it too much to stop. Today's example is using "non-brainer" in place of "nobrainer". Harmless misspelling because it should get the same point across, "self-evident". But entertaining, if the reader misinterprets "non-brainer" as "brainless".
Using an XML file for application configuration may seem like a nobrainer. After all, XML is simple and universally supported.
However, in some scenarios, attributes/annotations are sufficient. In some scenarios at the other end of the complexity spectrum, a static XML document isn't flexible enough to do the job, so doing the configuration in actual code (but nevertheless calling the whole shebang a DSL) is necessary. So while XML configuration can seem like a nobrainer, it may in fact be closer to a nonbrainer.
Using an XML file for application configuration may seem like a nobrainer. After all, XML is simple and universally supported.
However, in some scenarios, attributes/annotations are sufficient. In some scenarios at the other end of the complexity spectrum, a static XML document isn't flexible enough to do the job, so doing the configuration in actual code (but nevertheless calling the whole shebang a DSL) is necessary. So while XML configuration can seem like a nobrainer, it may in fact be closer to a nonbrainer.
Friday, January 04, 2008
seemless interface design
From somewhere on the Web:
This is yet another example of what automated spell-checking won't do for you. A "seamless" interface is highly prized because it is a joy to use (no leaky abstractions). A "seemless", meaning "unseemly", interface is not so highly prized.
The moral: work on your seemless interface design until it is seamless.
But look on the bright side, if the only time you hear about your software is when it breaks, take it as a compliment on your seemless interface design.
This is yet another example of what automated spell-checking won't do for you. A "seamless" interface is highly prized because it is a joy to use (no leaky abstractions). A "seemless", meaning "unseemly", interface is not so highly prized.
The moral: work on your seemless interface design until it is seamless.
Friday, December 14, 2007
peeve no. 253 is overuse of the word 'satire'
Here's a quotable line: "When someone uses pointed humor to discredit my opinions, it's vicious meanness. When someone uses pointed humor to discredit your opinions, it's satire." (I was inspired by Mel Brooks' "Tragedy is when I cut my finger. Comedy is when you walk into an open sewer and die."--link)
Regardless of the above, satire does have an objective definition, and that definition doesn't match up with some of the commoner usages of "satire" I've been reading. I bet some of you same offenders have been misusing "irony" and "decimated". As I understand it (he yelled from his padded cell), satire is the timeless technique of applying humor of exaggeration in public discourse to starkly emphasize the ridiculousness of an opposing viewpoint. Satire is a part of language; it predates telecommunication, mass communication, photography, and practical electricity. Effective satire, especially satire which stands a minute chance of influencing others, requires a corresponding degree of intelligence and wit. A Modest Proposal is an excellent example. In politics, which is a subject I attempt to studiously avoid in this blog even in the face of an imminent presidential election year, satire is a welcome diversion from the typical "shout louder and more often" tactic. I respect satire.
Having described satire, it should be clearer what satire is not. Admittedly, my idealization of satire may not perfectly fit the official/academic category of satire.
Regardless of the above, satire does have an objective definition, and that definition doesn't match up with some of the commoner usages of "satire" I've been reading. I bet some of you same offenders have been misusing "irony" and "decimated". As I understand it (he yelled from his padded cell), satire is the timeless technique of applying humor of exaggeration in public discourse to starkly emphasize the ridiculousness of an opposing viewpoint. Satire is a part of language; it predates telecommunication, mass communication, photography, and practical electricity. Effective satire, especially satire which stands a minute chance of influencing others, requires a corresponding degree of intelligence and wit. A Modest Proposal is an excellent example. In politics, which is a subject I attempt to studiously avoid in this blog even in the face of an imminent presidential election year, satire is a welcome diversion from the typical "shout louder and more often" tactic. I respect satire.
Having described satire, it should be clearer what satire is not. Admittedly, my idealization of satire may not perfectly fit the official/academic category of satire.
- Satire is not synonymous with political humor, because not all political humor is satire. A joke which has a political subject might not be a satirical joke.
- Satire is not synonymous with sarcasm, although both include the idea of statements whose intended purpose is to express the opposite of its meaning. Both include the idea of statements that attack something. (Side comment: some comments I've heard called "sarcastic" should be called "facetious".) However, sarcasm is the more general of the two. Satire may be an extended application of sarcasm to a particular viewpoint.
- Satire is not an attack on a politician's personal appearance, personality, mannerisms, etc. It's an attack on his or her beliefs or actions.
- Satire is more than a hodgepodge of one or two line quips on political issues. Satire employs greater depth in narrower focus, as it attempts to illustrate that a viewpoint is not merely funny, but ludicrous.
- Satire is more than creating unflattering fictional caricatures of an opponent or viewpoint--perhaps that technique is satire, but no more than the lowest form of it. Satire's goal is to make a point. Having the fictional caricature say something like "rustle me up some ding-dongs" may be worth a chuckle (but hardly more), yet it neither discredits follies nor imparts wisdom.
Tuesday, November 06, 2007
DIY expletives
I was about to apologize for writing something self-indulgent, but then I remembered this is a blog. Moving along...
I've fallen into the habit of saying DIY (do-it-yourself) expletives. Making up expletives isn't difficult. With practice, driven by the frustrations of everyday life, the original sound combinations just flow off the lips like, uh, spittle. Observe these helpful tips, which are more guidelines than rules:
I've fallen into the habit of saying DIY (do-it-yourself) expletives. Making up expletives isn't difficult. With practice, driven by the frustrations of everyday life, the original sound combinations just flow off the lips like, uh, spittle. Observe these helpful tips, which are more guidelines than rules:
- Keep each individual "word" short. Expletives beyond two syllables can be unwieldy and unsatisfying. The goal is acting as an embodiment of anger and rage--emotions of violent aggression.
- The limitation on the length and complexity of each word doesn't apply to the "sentence" as a whole. Speaking multiple words in rapid succession is great for overall effect, even more so in situations when loudness is prohibited.
- To start a "word", I like to use the consonants k, t, d, m, s. To a lesser degree I also sprinkle in usage of p, h, b, n, g (hard or soft pronunciation, but more often hard), and f. More complicated consonantal sounds can be handy for adding flavor, such as "st","ch", "sp". By all means include gutturals, if you can without hurting yourself or working too hard.
- I like to use the vowel sounds "ah", "oo", "oh". Other vowel sounds can help to break up monotony, perhaps in the middle or end of a statement, but in any case shouldn't draw attention too far away from the consonants. Following up a vowel sound with another vowel sound ("oo-ee" for example) is probably not conducive to maintaining peppy rhythm and tempo.
- "Words" with multiple syllables (not more than two or three per word, recall!) are simply constructed by combining monosyllabic words.
- Emphasize whichever syllable you like. Variety is what I prefer.
- The last tip is counterintuitive: don't let the preceding tips slow you down or stop you from creating a word that feels right. Practice and developing the habit are more important.
- "Mah-TOO-choh!"
- "Fah soo poh NOOST!"
- "KOH-dahb hoom BAYSH-tah!"
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Tuesday, August 21, 2007
lives effected by Hurricane Dean
Let me start out by saying that my sympathy goes out to all those in hurricane areas.
But reading "whose lives were effected by Hurricane Dean" in a real news article makes me chuckle. If you don't know why, search for "affect effect" on the Web to learn the distinction between the verbs "affect" and "effect".
If your life was effected by Hurricane Dean, your father is a blow-hard. (KA-ching!)
But reading "whose lives were effected by Hurricane Dean" in a real news article makes me chuckle. If you don't know why, search for "affect effect" on the Web to learn the distinction between the verbs "affect" and "effect".
If your life was effected by Hurricane Dean, your father is a blow-hard. (KA-ching!)
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